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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DEFENSE EXPERTS
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead 1/J & Richard W. Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western ReseNe University

In many criminal cases, securing the services of
experts to examine evidence, to advise counsel, and to
testify at trial is critical. As the ABA Standards note: "The
quality of representation at trial ... may be excellent and
yet valueless to the defendant if his defense requires the
assistance of a psychiatrist or handwriting expert and no
such services are available." ABA Standards Relating to
Providing Defense Services 5-1.4 (2d ed. 1980).
As early as 1929, Justice Cardozo commented: "[U]pon
the trial of certain issues, such as insanity or forgery,
experts are often necessary both for the prosecution and
for defense .... (A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is unable because of poverty to parry by his
own witnesses the thrusts of those against him." Reilly v.
Berry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (1929).

(1981), had ruled that an indigent defendant in a paternity
action, a "quasi-criminal" proceeding, had the right to a
blood grouping test at state expense.
Nevertheless, some courts continued to refuse to
recognize a right to expert assistance in criminal cases.
For example, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded:
"Neither the United States Constitution nor the Mississippi
Constitution requires that the Nation or State furnish an
indigent defendant with the assistance of a psychiatrist.
The only assistance that they require is the assistance of
legal counsel." Phillips v. State, 197 So. 2d 241,244
(Miss. 1967), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 1050 (1968). In 1985,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized, for the first
time, a due process right to expert assistance; that case
was Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).

SMITH v. BALDI
Prior to 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court had considered
an indigent's right to expert services only once. In United
States ex rei. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953), a murder
defendant argued that "the assistance of a psychiatrist
was necessary to afford him adequate counsel" in the
presentation of his insanity defense and thus, the state
was obligated to provide such assistance./d. at 568. In
rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court stated, "We
cannot say that the State has that duty by constitutional
mandate." /d.
Smith, however, was not a convincing precedent. First,
it could easily be distinguished on the facts. Two defense
psychiatrists had examined Smith, and consequently the
Supreme Court's opinion could be read as rejecting only
a right to additional experts. See Bush v. McCollum, 231
F. Supp. 560, 564 (N.D. Tex. 1964) (court distinguished
Smith because two defense psychiatrists had testified in
that case), aff'd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965).
More importantly, Smith was decided in 1953, and its
continued vitality after the Warren Court's revolution in
criminal procedure during the 1960s seemed suspect.
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit had noted that the "Baldi decision ... was severely undercut by the Court's decision in
Griffin v. Illinois." Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383,
1391 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979). By
1981, the Supreme Court, in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1

AKE v. OKLAHOMA
Ake was charged with capital murder. At arraignment,
his conduct was "so bizarre" that the trial judge ordered,
sua sponte, a mental evaluation. Ake was found
incompetent to stand trial but later recovered due to
antipsychotic drugs. When the prosecution resumed,
Ake's attorney requested a psychiatric evaluation at state
expense to prepare an insanity defense.
Citing Smith, the trial court refused. Thus, although
insanity was the only contested issue at trial, no
psychiatrists testified on this issue, and Ake was convicted. In seeking the death penalty, the prosecution relied
on state psychiatrists, who testified that Ake was
"dangerous to society." This testimony stood unrebutted
because Akecould not afford an expert. On review, the
Supreme Court overturned Ake's conviction.
The Court addressed the precedential value of Smith.
Since defense psychiatrists had testified in Smith, the
Court held that Smith did not stand for the broad proposition that there was no constitutional right to a psychiatric
examination, but at most, stood for "the proposition that
there is no constitutional right to more psychiatric assistance than the defendant in Smith had received." /d. at 85.
More importantly, the Court recognized that Smith had
been decided "at a time when indigent defendants in
state courts had no constitutional right to even the presence of counsel." /d. Thus, according to the Court, Smith
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did not preclude consideration of "whether fundamental
fairness today requires a different result." /d.
The Court began its analysis bycommenting: "[W]hen
a State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent
defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to
assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense." /d. at 76. This fair opportunity mandates
that an accused be provided with the "basic tools of an
adequate defense." /d. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina,
404 u.s. 226 (1971)).
The Court's due process analysis relied on a threepronged test derived from Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976):
.
Three factors are relevant to this determination. The
first is the private interest that will be affected by the
action of the State. The second is the governmental
interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be
provided. The third is the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are
sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
affected interest if those safeguards are not provided.
470 U.S. at 77.
Applying these factors, the Court found that a defendant's interest in the accuracy of a criminal trial that
placed his life or liberty at risk "is almost uniquely
compelling." /d. at 78. In contrast, the state's only interest
is economic. Although the state claimed that the cost of
providing expert assistance would result in "a staggering
burden to the State," the Court dismissed this argument,
pointing out (1) that many other jurisdictions provided
psychiatric assistance to indigent defendants and (2) that
its holding was limited to "one competent psychiatrist."
/d. at '79, finally, the Court considered the probable value
of the assistance sought and the risk of error if it was not
provided. The Court concluded that the need for expert
assistance was criticaland the risk of error "extremely
high" if assistance is not provided. /d. at 82. In sum, the
Court wrote:

NONCAPITAL CASES
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that Ake involved a capital case: "The facts of the
case and the question presented confine the actual holding of the Court. In capital cases the finality of the
sentence imposed warrants protections that may or may
not be required in other cases." /d. at 87. Some courts
have accepted this limitation, one writing that "Ake does
not reach noncapital cases." lsom v. State, 488 So. 2d 12,
13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). Accord McCord v. State, 507
So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
Although Ake involved a capital defendant, nothing in
the majority opinion suggested that the newly-recognized
right to expert as.sistance was limited to death penalty
cases. Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, implicitly
acknowledged that the majority opinion was not so limited.
He criticized the majority because "the constitutional
rule announced by the Court is far too broad. I would limit
the rule to capital cases." 470 U.S. at 87.
Most courts assume that Ake applies to noncapital
cases. As the Eighth Circuit has noted, "Nor do we draw
a decisive line for due-process purposes between capital
and noncapital cases." Little v. Armantrout, 835 F.2d
1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987)(en bane) (error to fail to appoint
hypnotist), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988). See also
Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640, 643 (11th Cir. 1991)
(prison term imposed).

NONPSYCHIATRIC EXPERTS
Ake involved psychiatric experts in an insanity case,
and although the importance of expert testimony in this
type of trial played a critical role in the decision, the
Court's rationale extends to prosecutions involving other
types of experts. Indeed, the Court not only held that Ake
had the rightto expert assistance on the insanity defense
but also on the ''future dangerousness" issue raised in
the penalty stage: "[D]ue process requires access to a
psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to the
testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in
preparation at the sentencing phase." 470 U.S. at 84.
Moreover, in a later case, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472
U.S. 320, 323 n. 1 (1985), the Court declined to consider a
trial court's refusal to appoint fingerprint and ballistics
experts because the defendant had not made a sufficient
showing of need. The Court, however, gave no indication
that fingerprint or ballistic experts were beyond the
scope of Ake.

We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense
is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution
requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's
assistance on this issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one.ld. at 74.
The facts met this standard: (1)Ake's only defense was
insanity. (2) His bizarre behavior at the arraignment, just
four months after the crime, prompted the trial court to
order, sua sponte, a mental examination. (3) A state
psychiatrist declared Ake incompetent to stand trial. (4)
He was found competent six weeks later only if he stayed
on Thorazine, an antipsychotic drug. (5) The state's
psychiatric testimony acknowledged the severity of Ake's
mental illness and possibly that it "might have begun
many years earlier." /d. at 86. (6) The burden of producing
evidence of insanity rested, under state law, with the
defendant. In a footnote, however, the Court commented:
"We express no opinion as to whether any of these
factors, alone or in combination, is necessary to make
this finding." /d. at 86 n. 12.
While the Ake decision settled the core issue by recognizing a right to expert assistance, it left a number of
important issues unresolved. These issues are
discussed in the following sections.

Lower Court Disagreements
Nevertheless, the cases disagree. For example, the
Alabama Supreme Court rejected a defense request for
the appointment of a forensic pathologist by noting that
"there is nothing contained in the Ake decision to
suggest that the United States Supreme Court was
addressing anything other than psychiatrists and the
insanity defense." Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 82
(Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985). Similarly, in
Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986), the court, in rejecting
a request for a bloodstain expert, distinguished insanity
cases:
[The] risk [of an erroneous result] in other areas of
scientific evidence is not necessarily present because
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the scientific expert is often able to explain to the jury
how a conclusion was reached, the defense counsel
can attack that conclusion, and the jury can then decide
whether the conclusion had a sound basis./d. at 839.
Accord Stafford v. Love, 726 P.2d 894, 896 (Okla. 1986).
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit has ruled that "[t]here is
no principled way to distinguish between psychiatric and
non psychiatric experts. The question in each case must
be not what field of science or expert knowledge is
involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is
in the case, and how much help a defense expert could
have given." Little v. Armantrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243
(8th Cir. 1987} (en bane} (error to fail to appoint hypnotist},
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988}.
Other cases have recognized a right to assistance
outside the insanity context, including:
fingerprint experts, State v. Bridges, 325 N.C. 529,
533-34, 385 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1989}; State v. Moore, 321
N.C. 327, 343-45, 364 S.E.2d 648, 656-57 (1988).
hypnotists, Little v. Armantrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243
(8th Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988}.
serologists, State v. Carmouche, 527 So. 2d 307 (La.
1988).
psychologists on the "battered wife syndrome," Dunn
v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 314 (10th Cir. 1992).
bite mark expert, Thornton v. State, 255 Ga. 434, 435,
339 S.E.2d 240, 241 (1986); .
intoxication expert, State v. Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589, 590
(Iowa 1987).

That duty [to appoint a psychiatrist] cannot be satisfied
with the appointment of an expert who ultimately testifies contrary to the defense on the issue of competence. The essential benefit of having an expert in the
first place is denied the defendant when the services of
the doctor must be shared with the prosecution. In this
case, the benefit sought was not only the testimony of
a psychiatrist to present the defendant's side of the
case, but also the assistance of an expert to interpret
the findings of an expert witness and to aid in the
preparation of his cross-examination. Without that
assistance, the defendant was deprived of the fair trial
due process demands. United States v. Sloan, 776
F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1985).
Accord Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992);
Lilies v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 340 (10th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992); United States v. Austin, 933
F.2d 833, 841 (10th Cir. 1991).
Other decisions support this view. The Ninth Circuit
has commented:
The right to psychiatric assistance does not mean the
right to place the report of a "neutral" psychiatrist
before the court; rather it means the right to use the
services of a psychiatrist in whatever capacity defense
counsel deems appropriate- including to decide,
with the psychiatrist's assistance, not to present to the
court particular claims of mental impairment. Smith v.
McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990).
Accord Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640, 643 (11th Cir.
1991); Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1312-13 (N.D.
Ga. 1989) ("Ake contemplates a psychiatrist who will
work closely with the defense by conducting an independent examination, testifying if necessary, and preparing
for the sentencing phase of the trial"), aff'd, 908 F.2d 695
(11th Cir. 1990).

NEUTRAl OR PARTISAN EXPERTS
Ake fails to specify clearly the role of the expertwhether the appointment of a neutral expert, who reports
to the court, satisfies due process, or whether a partisan
defense expert is required. At one point in the opinion the
Court stated that the defendant had the right to "one
competent psychiatrist" when insanity is raised. 470 U.S.
at 79. It also held that this right did not include the "right
to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to
receive funds to hire his own." /d. at 83.
Neither of these passages, however, is conclusive, and
other passages point toward a partisan role. According to
the Court, the accused is guaranteed "access to a
competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate
examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense." /d. This expert would
"conduct a professional examination on issues relevant
to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity
defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in
preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric
witnesses." /d. at 82.

THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT
The defendant has the burden of establishing the need
for expert assistance. According to Ake, the accused
must make a "preliminary showing" that an issue requiring expert assistance is "likely to be a significant factor at
trial." 470 U.S. at 74. In a later case, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), the Court declined to consider a
trial court's refusal to appoint fingerprint and "ballistics"
experts because the defendant had "offered little more
than undeveloped assertions that the requested
assistance would be beneficial." /d. at 323 n.1.
Nevertheless, the precise dimensions of this threshold
showing are not clear. As one court has noted, "the Ake
decision fails to establish a bright line test for determining when a defendant has demonstrated that sanity at
the time of the offense will be a significant factor at the
time of trial." Volson v. Blackburn, 794 F.2d 173, 176 (5th
Cir. 1986).
The Eleventh Circuit has imposed a demanding
threshold requirement. According to that court:
Ake and Caldwell, taken together, hold that a defendant must demonstrate something more than a mere
possibility of assistance from a requested expert; due
process does not require the government automatically
to provide indigent defendants with expert assistance
upon demand. Rather, a fair reading of these precedents
is that a defendant must show the trial court that there

lower Court Disagreements
The lower courts split on this issue. The Fifth Circuit
has ruled that a "court-appointed psychiatrist, whose
opinion and testimony is available to both sides, satisfies
[the accused's] rights." Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d
185, 191 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The state is not required to
permit defendants to shop around for a favorable
expert ... He has no right to the appointment of a
psychiatrist who will reach biased or only favorable
conclusions"}, cert. denied, 495 U.S. 963 (1990}.
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit rejected that view:
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exists a reasonable probability both that an expert
would be of assistance to the defense and that denial
of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally
unfair trial. Thus, if a defendant wants an expert to
assist his attorney in confronting the prosecution's
proof- by preparing counsel to cross-examine the
prosecution's experts or by providing rebuttal testimony- he must inform the court of the nature of the
prosecution's case and how the requested expert
would be useful. At the very least, he must inform the
trial court about the nature of the crime and the
evidence linking him to the crime. By the same token,
if the defendant desires the appointment of an expert
so that he can present an affirmative defense, such as
insanity, he must demonstrate a substantial basis for
the defense, as the defendant did in Ake. In each
instance, the defendant's showing must also include a
specific description of the expert or experts desired;
without this basic information, the court would be
unable to grant the defendant's motion, because the
court would not know what type of expert was needed.
In addition, the defendant should inform the court why
the particular expert is necessary. Moore v. Kemp, 809
F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 481
u.s. 1054 (1987).

(3) The name, qualifications, fees, etc. of the
desired expert;
(4) The reasonableness of the expert's fees and
other costs;
(5) The objective bases for the request (specific
factual reasons for why an expert is necessary);
(6) The subjective bases for the request (personal
observations of your client such as possible
emotional problems or drug addiction, etc. about
which you wish to have an expert testify);
(7) The legal necessity for the expert's testimony,
i.e., what element will it attack;
(8) The legal entitlement to an independent expert;
and,
(9) The inadequacy of available government
experts.
Hollander & Baldwin, "Expert Testimony in Criminal
Trials: Creative Uses, Creative Attacks," 15 Champion 6,
12 (Dec. 1991).
RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE EXPERT
Several defendants have argued that Ake includes the
right to effective expert assistance. Indeed, the Court in
Ake did refer to the right to "one competent psychiatrist."
Nevertheless, the lower courts have rejected this argument. According to the Fourth Circuit: "To inaugurate a
c~nstitutional or procedural rule of an ineffective expert
w1tness in lieu of the constitutional standard of an
ineffective attorney ... is going further than the federal
procedural demands of a fair trial and the constitution
require." ':"'aye v. Murray, 884 F.2d 765, 767 (4th Cir.),
cert. demed, 492 U.S. 936 (1989).
The Seventh Circuit objected that such a rule would
require the federal courts "to engage in a form of
'psychiatric medical malpractice' review." Silagy v.
Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1013 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 u.s. 1024 (1991).
The Ninth Circuit also declined to become enmeshed
in such "a psycho-legal quagmire." Harris v. Vasquez,
943 F.2d 930, 951 (9th Cir. 1991).

The main problem with the rebuttal situation referred
to in this quotation is the lack of adequate defense
discovery. The court acknowledged this problem in a
footnote: "In a jurisdiction still employing 'trial by
ambush,' the defendant might have to ask the court to
make the prosecutor disclose the theory of his case and
theresults of any tests that may have been performed by
government experts or at the government's request." /d.
at 712 n. 10. For a discussion of discovery issues, see
Giannelli, "Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and
DNA," 44 Vand. L. Rev. 791 (1991).
Several courts have explained the standard as follows:
"[T]he defendant must show a reasonable probability
that an expert would aid in his defense, and that denial of
expert assistance would result in an unfair trial." Little v.
Armantrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987) (en bane),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988). Others require the
defendant to show a "clear and genuine" issue, "one that
constitutes a 'close' question which may well be decided
one way or the other. It must be one that is fairly debatable or in doubt." Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203,
1211 (10th Cir. 1986).
If the threshold standard is too high, the defendant is
placed in a "Catch-22" situation, in which the standard
"demand[s] that the defendant possess already the
expertise of the witness sought." State v. Moore, 321 N.C.
327, 345,364 S.E.2d 648, 657 (1988). See also Harris,
''Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain
Beyond the Reach For The Indigent," 68 N.C. L. Rev. 763
(1990) (arguing lower courts are setting the threshold
requirement too high and thus not providing the partisan
expert required by Ake).

RELATED ISSUES
A number of other issues are raised by Ake. Several
are discussed below.
Ex Parte Procedure
First, there is a procedural issue, which turns on which
view of the expert's role is adopted. If the accused has a
right to a partisan expert, then the proceedings seeking
appointment should be ex parte, as they are under the
Criminal Justice Act. 18 U.S.C. 3006(A)(e) (1985). The Ake
decision does not explicitly address this issue, although
at one point the Court spoke of an "ex parte threshold
showing." 470 U.S. at 82.
Moreover, several courts have ruled that an application
for appointment of an expert should be considered in an
ex parte hearing: "[l]n making the requisite showing
defendant could be placed in a position of revealing his
theory of the case. He therefore has a legitimate interest
in making that showing ex parte." Brooks v. State, 259
Ga. 562, 566,385 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1018 (1990). Accord MacGregor v. State, 733 P.2d
416 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).

Motion for Appointment
According to two commentators, a motion for the
appointment of an expert should include:
(1) The type of expert necessary;
(2) The assistance the expert will provide to the defense;
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Victim Examinations
A second issue concerns whether the right to an
expert extends to a right to require an alleged victim to be
examined by such an expert. This issue arises in cases
in which the prosecution intends to offer evidence of
"rape trauma syndrome" or "child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome." For example, the Nevada Supreme
Court has held that "it is error to deny a defendant the
assistance of a defense psychologist or psychiatrist to
examine the child-victim and testify at trial when the
State is provided such assistance." Lickey v. State, 827
P.2d 824, 826 (1992).
Prosecution Monopoly
Finally, one case involved expert assistance in a field
where the prosecution had a monopoly. In People v.
Evans, 141 Misc. 2d 781, 534 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct.
1988), the court ordered the N.Y.C. Police Department's
Auto Crime Division to assign an experienced officer to
assist the defense in inspecting vehicles: "Where the
government holds a monopoly of expertise on a matter
that reasonably bears on a defense in a criminal action,
due process requires that a defendant be afforded
access to this expertise." /d. at 783.

United States, 582 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980).
Accord Wood v. Zahradnick, 578 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir.
1978); United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1279 (5th
Cir. 1976) ("[W]hen an insanity defense is appropriate
and the defendant lacks funds to secure private psychiatric
assistance, it is the duty of his attorney to seek such
assistance through the use of [the Criminal Justice
Act]"); United States v. Fratus, 530 F.2d 644, 649-50 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976); United
States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1164 (5th Cir. 1974);
Owsley v. Peyton, 368 F.2d 1002, 1003 (4th Cir. 1966);
Loe v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 662,672 (E. D. Va.
1982) (counsel ineffective for failing to request a partisan
expert under C.J.A.); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142,
163-64, 599 P.2d 587, 598-600, 158 Ca!. Rptr. 281, 292-93
(1979); Moore v. State, 827 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Mo. 1992)
(counsel ineffective for failing to request serological test).
Right to Expert Assistance
If failure to secure expert assistance may constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel, then it is but a short
step to recognizing that the sixth amendment places an
affirmative duty upon the state to provide expert services
to indigent defendants. See Lickey v. State, 827 P.2d 824,
826 (Nev. 1992) ("If failure to request a psychological
examination constitutes grounds for a finding of ineffective counsel, it logically follows that a defendant facing
charges of sexual assault of a minor should be afforded
an expert psychiatric witness").
A number of courts have adopted this view: "[T]he
right to counsel is meaningless if the lawyer is unable to
make an effective defense because he has no funds to
provide the specialized testimony which the case
requires." Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560, 565 (N.D.
Tex. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965). See also
Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236, 1243-44 (6th Cir. 1984);
Brinks v. Alabama, 465 F.2d 446, 449 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1979); Hintz v. Beta, 379 F.2d 937,
941 (5th Cir. 1967) ("effective assistance of counsel ...
may necessitate a psychiatric examination of a defendant"); Greer v. Beta, 379 F.2d 923,925 (5th Cir. 1967)
(state policy of not providing psychiatric experts for
defense "may not ... avoid the federal constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel"); Corenevsky
v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 307, 319, 682 P.2d 360, 367,
204 Cal. Rptr. 165, 172 (1984) (right to counsel "includes
the right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services"); In re Ketchel, 68 Cal. 2d 397, 399, 438 P.2d 625,
627, 66 Cal. Rptr. 881, 883 (1968); Taylor v. Superior
Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1217, 1218, 215 Cal. Rptr. 73, 74
(1985) (fingerprint expert); People v. Worthy, 109 Cal.
App. 3d 514, 518-19, 167 Cal. Rptr. 402, 404-05 (1980);
English v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 393 (Iowa 1981);
State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1262-63 (Me. 1983); State
v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399,416, 217 A.2d 441, 450 (1966); State
v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 241, 243-44, 453
P. 2d 421,422-23 (1969); State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 66,
277 S.E.2d 410, 418 (1981); State v. Dickamore, 22 Wash.
App. 851, 854,592 P.2d 681,683 (1979).
A leading case is Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th
Cir. 1980), in which an indigent murder defendant
requested the appointment of an independent forensic
pathologist to determine the victim's cause of death. The

OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Prior to Ake, a number of courts had recognized a
constitutional right to expert assistance. However, they
had disagreed on the constitutional basis for this right.
The right to effective assistance of counsel, equal protection, due process, and compulsory process had all been
relied upon. Because the Supreme Court in Ake rested
its decision on due process grounds, it did not consider
these alternative grounds: "Because we conclude that
the Due Process Clause guaranteed to Ake the
assistance he requested and was denied, we have no
occasion to consider the applicability of the Equal
Protection Clause, or the Sixth Amendment, in this
context." 470 U.S. at 87 n. 13.
These additional constitutional bases are discussed
below.
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the
Supreme Court held the sixth amendment right to counsel
applicable to the states. Accordingly, the state must
provide counsel to indigent defendants. The Court noted:
"[l]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
hailed into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him." /d. at 344. Moreover, the right to counsel includes
the right to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 71 (1932).
Failure to Seek Expert Assistance
Several courts have found ineffective assistance
Nhere defense counsel has failed to obtain the services
Jf expert witnesses: "The failure of defense counsel to
3eek such assistance when the need is apparent
jeprives an accused of adequate representation in viola:ion of his sixth amendment right to counsel." Proffitt v.
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request was denied by the state trial court. In granting
habeas relief, the Fourth Circuit based its decision on the
equal protection guarantee and the right to counsel:
"There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness." /d. at
1025. Under this theory, an expert should be appointed
whenever necessary for counsel to render effective
assistance; that is, "whenever the [expert] services are
'necessary to the preparation and presentation of an
adequate defense.' " Proffitt v. United States, 582 F.2d
854, 857 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980).
EQUAL PROTECTION
The equal protection argument for the appointment of
defense experts has its genesis in Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956), in which an indigent defendant challenged
a state practice of co_nditioning appellate review upon the
availability of a transcript that the defendant could not
afford. The Supreme Court held that failure to provide a
free transcript denied the accused due process and
equal protection. According to the Court, "There can be
no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has." /d. at 19
(plurality opinion).
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court
extended the "Griffin principle" to the appointment of
counsel for a first appeal as of right. Other cases also
echoed this principle: "Griffin v. Illinois and its progeny
established the principle that the State must, as a matter
of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when
those tools are available for a pric_eto other prisoners."
Brlttv.Narth-Carollna, 404 u.s. 226, 227 (1971). See also
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) ("Our decisions for more than a decade novihave made clear that
differences in access to the instruments needed to vindicate legal rights, when based upon the financial situation
of the defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution").
Several courts have relied on this line of cases when
recognizing an indigent's right to expert assistance. For
example, one court wrote:
It is obvious that only [the defendant's] inability to pay
for the services of a psychiatrist prevented a proper
presentation of his case. The Supreme Court has
unmistakably held that in criminal proceedings it will
not tolerate discrimination between indigents and
thosewho possess the means to protect their rights."
Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571, 573 (4th Cir. 1965).
Accord Bradford v. United States, 413 F.2d 467, 474 (5th
Cir. 1969); People v. Gunnerson, 74 Cal. App. 3d 370, 379,
141 Cal. Rptr. 488,494 (1977); Pierce v. State, 251 Ga.
590, 592-93,308 S.E.2d 367,368-69 (1983); State v. Olin,
103ldaho391, 394, 648 P.2d 203,206 (1982); State v.
Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1262-63 (Me. 1983).
Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980), which
was discussed in the preceding section, is a leading
case. Martin, an indigent, requested the services of a
forensic pathologist to evaluate the victim's cause of
death in a homicide prosecution. The Fourth Circuit held
that the trial court's refusal to appoint an expert "denied
[the defendant] equal protection of the law." /d. at 1027.
According to the court, the standard for determining
whether expert assistance is constitutionally required is
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"(a) whether a substantial question requiring expert
testimony arose over the cause of death, and (b) whether
Williams' defense could be fully developed without
professional assistance." /d. at 1026. The court's examination of the record revealed that a substantial question
about the cause of death had existed and that the
absence of an expert witness hampered the development
of this defense. Significantly, the court held that "[i]t is
not incumbent upon Williams to prove ... that an independent expert would have provided helpful testimony at
trial. An indigent prisoner ... should not be required to
present proof of what an expert would say when he is
denied access to an expert." /d. at 1026-27.

later Supreme Court Cases
The principal problem with this line of analysis is the
Supreme Court's later cases-in particular, Ross v.
Moffitt, 417-U.S. 600 (1974), which undercuts the GriffinDouglas rationale. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law 1119 (1988) (Douglas "effectively sterilized" in Ross).
Ross involved the appointment of counsel for discretionary appeals. The Court held that a state practice not
to appoint counsel in such cases satisfied the equal
protection guarantee. According to the Court, the equal
protection clause " 'does not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages.' "417 U.S. at 612 (quoting
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 24 (1973)). Although the Court recognized the
disadvantage an indigent suffered in comparison with a
non indigent in this context, it held that the
duty of the State ... is not to duplicate the legal
arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal
defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the
context of the State's appellate process./d. at 616.
Thus, the focus of the Court's analysis was not the
disparity between indigent and non indigent, but whether
the indigent had an "adequate opportunity" to present
his case.
'This approach smacks more of a due process rather
than an equal protection analysis. See Kamisar, "Poverty,
Equality and Criminal Procedure: From Griffin v. Illinois
and Douglas v. California to Ross v. Moffitt," in National
College of District Attorneys, Constitutional Law Deskbook
1-79, 1-101 (3d ed. 1978). In a later case, the Court noted
that "[d]ue process and equal protection principles
converge in the Court's analysis in these cases."
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983). In Ross,
the Court pointed ollt that equal protection analysis
"emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between
classes of individuals whose situations are arguably
indistinguishable," whereas due process analysis
"emphasizes fairness between the State and the
individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other
individuals in the same situation may be treated." 417
U.S. at 609. See also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405
(1985); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983).
Ross weakens the equal protection argument for
expert assistance, and a number of courts have cited
Ross in upholding denials of requests for expert
assistance. Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. 725, 736 (D.
Md. 1977); State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 66, 277 S.E.2d

410, 418 (1981); State v. Gray, 292 N.C. 270, 277-78, 233
S.E.2d 905,911 (1977); Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531,
535 (Tenn. 1977). Nevertheless, it does not completely
undercut it. Without an expert witness, an indigent may
not have an "adequate opportunity" to present a defense.
This standard, however, is similar, if not identical, to the
Court's due process analysis in Ake.

assure a fair trial will depend upon the facts in each
case." /d. at 234. Watson was such a case because the
"issue of handwriting goes to the heart of the defense"
and the expert's testimony "may have been crucial" to
that defense. /d.
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